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North Carolina Extends Its Anti-Deficiency Statute:
Merritt v. Edwards Ridge
In 1933 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted an anti-deficiency
judgment statute1 that prohibited mortgagee-vendors from obtaining deficiency
judgments upon foreclosure of purchase money mortgages and deeds of trust. 2
While the anti-deficiency statute expressly prohibits deficiency judgments only
when the mortgagee foreclosing on the purchase money mortgage is also the
original seller,3 the statute does not limit the prohibition specifically to residen-
tial mortgages.4 Because seller financing predominantly is used today to provide
funds for commercial development, 5 the anti-deficiency statute primarily pre-
cludes deficiency judgments against sophisticated commercial investors. Yet, a
commercial investor, unlike the ordinary home buyer, speculates in land expect-
ing to assume the business risks associated with real estate investment. Because
protecting these commercial mortgagors from deficiency judgments misallocates
1. Act of Feb. 6, 1933, ch. 36, § 1, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 28 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984)). Historically, a mortgagee could obtain a deficiency judgment when
the amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was insufficient to satisfy
the balance owed by the defaulting mortgagor. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.1 (2d ed. 1985). The anti-deficiency statute applies to both judi-
cial foreclosures and foreclosures pursuant to a powers of sale clause in a deed of trust. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984). A "purchase money mortgage" refers to the mortgage
interest retained by a lender who provides the necessary funds for a buyer to purchase the land that
serves as the underlying security. A purchase money "deed of trust" pertains to the situation in
which a lender secures repayment of the purchase money loan by providing for a third party trustee
to retain title to the property purchased. These instruments typically contain a "powers of sale"
clause that permits either the mortgagee or trustee to foreclose and sell the property upon the buyer's
default. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note I, § 1.6. This Note will use the
terms "purchase money mortgage" and "deed of trust" interchangeably.
3. The anti-deficiency statute provides:
In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained
in any mortgage or deed of trust executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or
decree is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after February 6, 1933, to
secure to the seller the payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property, the
mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall
not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or
obligation secured by the same: Provided, said evidence of indebtedness shows upon the
face that it is for balance of purchase money for real estate: Provided, further, that when
said note or notes are prepared under the direction and supervision of the seller or sellers,
he, it, or they shall cause a provision to be inserted in said note disclosing that it is for
purchase money of real estate; in default of which the seller or sellers shall be liable to
purchaser for any loss which he might sustain by reason of the failure to insert said provi-
sions as herein set out.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984).
4. Id. Thus, when seller financing is involved, the statute shelters both sophisticated commer-
cial developers and ordinary home buyers from deficiency judgments. Several factors contribute to
the use of seller financing in both commercial and residential real estate transactions. First, if a
buyer fails to qualify for third-party lending, then the seller must finance all or part of the purchase
price to consummate the sale. Second, the parties may use seller financing to avoid the additional
transaction costs generally associated with third-party lending. Finally, the seller may attempt par-
tially to defer recognition of any realized gain by financing the sale and electing installment sales
treatment for tax purposes.
5. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.9.
the investment risk of declining property values to the mortgagee, some com-
mentators argue that the present-day function of the statute fails to comport
with commercial reality.6
Despite these criticisms, in the past decade the North Carolina Supreme
Court has broadly construed the anti-deficiency judgment statute, thereby signif-
icantly expanding the protection provided to defaulting mortgagors. 7 Most re-
cently, in Merritt v. Edwards Ridge,8 the supreme court considered whether the
anti-deficiency statute prohibits a mortgagee-vendor from recovering attorneys'
fees and other costs associated with a foreclosure sale. 9 The promissory note at
issue expressly provided that the defaulting buyer, a partnership formed to de-
velop real estate, was to bear these costs. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the statute's elimination of deficiency judgments precluded any recovery of such
costs by the mortgagee.10 Once again, the court broadly construed the statute to
deny mortgagee-vendors relief and to protect defaulting commercial investors.1 1
This Note examines the legislative intent behind section 45-21.38 and the
extent to which the court's holding in Merritt is consistent with that intent. The
Note also considers the potential impact of Merritt on seller financing, especially
given that previous judicial interpretations of the statute have provided extensive
mortgagor protection at the expense of mortgagee-sellers. Finally, the Note ex-
amines the negative effects and uncertainty in commercial seller-financed trans-
actions created by broad applications of the anti-deficiency statute and
concludes that the general assembly should amend the North Carolina statute to
distinguish between commercial and residential seller-financed real estate
transactions.
Plaintiff in Merritt sold defendant, a general partnership organized for real
estate development, a large tract of undeveloped land. In return, defendant exe-
cuted two promissory notes secured by a purchase money deed of trust. Each
note provided "that upon default the maker would pay the holder fifteen percent
of the outstanding balance for reasonable attorneys' fees and pay all other rea-
6. Note, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co-
North Carolina Anti- Deficiency Judgment Statute Bars Personal Actions Against Purchase Money
Mortgagors, 59 N.C.L. REv. 855, 865 (1980) (questioning the "wisdom of permitting the statute to
remain in force" because the North Carolina Supreme Court's "construction of the statute disrupts
traditional allocation of risk concepts in commercial real estate transactions"); see also Leipziger,
Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries Again, 22 UCLA L. REv. 753, 755 &
776-77 (1975) (noting that supreme court in California, a state with an anti-deficiency statute similar
to North Carolina's, adopted an "analytically sounder" approach by applying a "residential/com-
mercial dichotomy" that permits deficiency judgments against mortgagors who accept real estate
investment risks for a commercial purpose).
7. See Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 373, 250 S.E.2d 271,
275 (1979) (concluding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 limits mortgagee-vendor's relief to recovery of
the security); Barnaby v. Boardman, 313 N.C. 565, 569-71, 330 S.E.2d 600, 602-04 (1985) (conclud-
ing mortgagee-vendor could not circumvent anti-deficiency statute by first releasing his security in-
terest and then bringing an in personam action on the "newly" unsecured promissory note). For a
discussion of Ross Realty and Barnaby, see infra note 38. In each case the court maintained that its
broad statutory construction was consistent with the general assembly's intent.
8. 323 N.C. 330, 372 S.E.2d 559 (1988).
9. Id. at 331-32, 372 S.E.2d at 560.
10. Id. at 335-36, 372 S.E.2d at 562-63.
11. See id. at 337, 372 S.E.2d at 563.
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sonable expenses incurred by the holder in the exercise of any of the holder's
rights and remedies upon default." 12
After making several payments on the note, defendant defaulted. Plaintiff
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale conducted by the trustee and paid
the foreclosure costs. Thereafter plaintiff sought judicial enforcement of the
note provisions requiring defendant to repay plaintiff for any foreclosure costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. 13
Affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment for plaintiff-
seller, the court of appeals interpreted the anti-deficiency statute to prohibit only
recovery of expenses constituting part of the unpaid purchase price owed on the
note.14 Thus, the court concluded that "insofar as attorneys' fees and expenses
[after default] are not part of the balance owing on the note," recovery of these
costs did not constitute a deficiency judgment within the meaning of the stat-
ute.1 5 In an opinion by Justice Mitchell, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the appellate court's decision failed to uphold the legisla-
tive intent to protect mortgagors from oppression by mortgagee-vendors.1 6 The
Merritt court emphasized that "the purchase money creditor is limited strictly to
the property conveyed" upon default by the mortgagor. 17 Furthermore, the
court decided that "the proceeds of a foreclosure sale are, constructively at least,
real property and stand in place of" the property conveyed. Therefore, upon
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property, the mortgagee's sole relief is the
amount of the proceeds in lieu of the property. 18
In a brief dissent, Justice Whichard accused the majority of placing a "judi-
cial gloss on the anti-deficiency judgment statute" that deprived plaintiff of the
12. Id. at 332, 372 S.E.2d at 561. These provisions were incorporated by reference into the
deed of trust. Id.
13. The promissory notes executed by defendant were for $200,000. The foreclosure sale, how-
ever, brought only $115,000. Taxes and other foreclosure costs, excluding attorneys' fees, amounted
to $7,000 and were paid with proceeds from the sale. Plaintiff initiated an action to recover the
$7,000 and reasonable attorneys' fees of $17,000 (approximately fifteen percent of $115,000 foreclo-
sure sale price). Plaintiff did not seek recovery of the $85,000 deficiency for the excess of the amount
owed on the two promissory notes over the foreclosure sale price.
14. Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 88 N.C. App. 132, 135, 362 S.E.2d 610, 611 (1987), rev'd, 323
N.C. 330, 372 S.E.2d 559 (1988). In permitting recovery ofthese costs, the court of appeals followed
its earlier decision in Reavis v. Ecological Dev., Inc., 53 N.C. App. 496, 281 S.E.2d 78 (1981). The
court of appeals in Merritt stated that the promissory notes in Merritt and Reavis used identical
language to allocate the attorneys' fees and foreclosure costs to the mortgagor. Merritt, 88 N.C.
App. at 135, 362 S.E.2d at 611.
15. Merritt, 88 N.C. App. at 135, 362 S.E.2d at 611.
16. Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 323 N.C. 330, 335, 372 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1988) (appellate court's
decision failed "to give proper weight to the intent of the General Assembly as construed" in both
Barnaby and Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271
(1979)).
17. Id. at 335, 372 S.E.2d at 562.
18. Id. at 336, 372 S.E.2d at 563. The court also cited section 45-21.31, which governs the
distribution of foreclosure sale proceeds. This section requires payment of the foreclosure costs
before the purchase money creditor may receive any proceeds from the sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-
21.31 (1984). The court concluded that the mortgagee, whose remedy is limited by section 45-21.38
to either the property conveyed or the proceeds of the sale, bears the burden of all foreclosure costs
because of the distribution requirements of section 45-21.31. See Merritt, 323 N.C. at 336, 372
S.E.2d at 563.
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benefits of a bargain. 19 As the sole dissenter, he asserted that neither the express
language of the statute nor public policy required the majority's result, and con-
cluded that the court of appeals' restrictive definition of a deficiency judgment
most closely approximated the general assembly's intent.20
Because the language of section 45-21.38 does not expressly deny recovery
of attorneys' fees and other foreclosure costs, the soundness of the Merritt
court's expansive application of the statute depends entirely on the correctness
of its interpretation of the general assembly's intent. Because of the lack of con-
ventional legislative history surrounding the statute's enactment, 21 the court re-
sorted to other sources in deriving the legislative purposes for enacting section
45-21.38.
The enactment of the statute during the Great Depression reflected the gen-
eral assembly's concern with widespread foreclosures and forced sales at de-
pressed prices. 22 While the values of the property securing the debt depreciated,
the likelihood of deficiency judgments upon foreclosure increased. In the ab-
sence of an anti-deficiency statute, foreclosure proceedings hot only presented
defaulting mortgagors with the potential loss of the purchased property, but also
with the risk of judgments enforceable against their unmortgaged assets.23
Thus, prior to 1933, defaulting mortgagors in North Carolina bore the entire
risk of decline in property values. 24 Given the plight of mortgagors, one com-
mentator concluded that the general assembly intended to "limit the creditor to
the property conveyed," 25 thus shifting the entire risk of declining property val-
ues to the mortgagee. 26
The decision to shift the risk of declining property values only to mortga-
gee-vendors, 27 however, indicates that something more than debtor relief was
involved. 28 This statutory restriction may reflect the general assembly's concern
19. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 338, 372 S.E.2d at 564 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Whichard, J., dissenting).
21. See Note, supra note 6, at 857 (pointing out the complete absence of legislative history and
scarcity of contemporary commentary).
22. See Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflict-
of-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE L.J 1, 13-14 (1960).
23. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 14. A defaulting mortgagor potentially suffers a
double loss-sacrificing both payments made toward the purchase of the property and any unmort-
gaged assets necessary to satisfy the deficiency judgment. See Note, supra note 6, at 857-58.
24. Note, REAL PROPERTY-North Carolina's Anti-Deficiency Statute: Is Suing on the Note
a Lost Option?- Barnaby v. Boardman, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 389, 393 (1987).
25. A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1933, 11 N.C.L. REv. 191, 219 (1933).
26. See Note, supra note 24, at 394 (noting that general assembly reallocated "the risk of a
decline in property values [to] the seller-mortgagee").
27. In 1961 a legislative amendment to section 45-21.38 made explicit that the statute does not
apply to third-party lenders. Act of June 2, 1961, ch. 604, 1961 N.C. Laws 793 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984)); see Childers v. Parker's, Inc. 274 N.C. 256, 263, 162 S.E.2d
481, 486 (1968).
28. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 16. For reasons previously stated, the general
assembly disliked deficiency judgments because of the inequities to defaulting mortgagors. See supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text. However, extension of credit by vendors typically occurs only
when the necessary credit cannot be obtained from third-party commercial lenders. Currie & Lie-
berman, supra note 22, at 33. Because the anti-deficiency statute is inapplicable to third-party lend-
ers, the general assembly's restriction of section 45-21.38 to seller financing indicates additional
concerns other than a general dislike of deficiency judgments. Id. at 18-19.
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with inequities that may result from amateur financing 29 involving a "seller-
mortgagee [who] often has a disproportionately powerful position. ' '30 One sig-
nificant inequity is the potential for unjust enrichment of mortgagee-vendors at
the expense of defaulting buyers. Frequently the mortgagee-seller, like plaintiff
in Merritt, is the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. In addition to regain-
ing possession of the land, the vendor also "keeps whatever payments the pur-
chaser may have made."' 31 Therefore, after foreclosure "the mortgagee has been
made whole by being restored to his original condition, with compensation (by
way of the installment payments) for the use of the property in the meantime. ' '32
To permit the vendor then to pursue a deficiency judgment would only aggra-
vate any preexisting inequities.
A second potential inequity resulting from seller financing is the problem of
overvaluation, because the seller usually establishes the terms of the sale.3 3
First, because the seller establishes the purchase price, the general assembly may
consider it equitable to deny him the opportunity to argue that the property has
subsequently declined in value.34 Furthermore, if a deficiency will result be-
cause of the "failure of the foreclosure sale to produce a bid resembling the true
value,"'35 then the seller could avoid resorting to a deficiency judgment by sub-
mitting a bid at the foreclosure sale equal to the balance owed on the note.36
Thus, absent an anti-deficiency statute, the seller can set a "high" purchase price
and then speculate in land, knowing that the buyer theoretically bears any risk
of decline in property value by way of a deficiency judgment. 37
Given the losses that defaulting mortgagors may endure in the absence of
anti-deficiency legislation, it is not surprising that the supreme court has con-
strued section 45-21.38 broadly to thwart mortgagee-sellers' attempts to circum-
29. See Note, supra note 6, at 858.
30. Note, supra note 24, at 393.
31. Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 30; see also Note, supra note 24, at 393 (observing
that defaulting mortgagors relinquish the purchased property, any down payment, and any regular
payments made on the note).
32. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 30.
33. See Leipziger, supra note 6, at 760-61.
34. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 30 (noting that seller is "estopped to deny" that
property is worth the full amount of the debt). This interpretation of the general assembly's intent is
further supported when one considers that sellers often set prices above the land's actual market
value. See id.
35. See Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Fore-
closure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 848 (1980) (noting that foreclosure sales often bring bids
below market value because they involve forced sales rather than arm's length deals between willing
sellers and willing buyers, and because these sales receive ineffective selling and promotional efforts).
36. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 30. In order to create a deficiency, the successful
bidder at the foreclosure sale must purchase the property for less than the balance owed to the seller.
If the true market value of the property exceeds the foreclosure sale price, then the seller can success-
fully purchase the property by bidding the balance owed on the note and can later resell the property
under more favorable conditions.
37. See Note, supra note 24, at 393-94. In contrast to mortgagee-sellers, a third-party lender
neither establishes the purchase price nor has a particular interest in promoting the sale of the land.
See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 31. Also, unlike the seller, the third-party creditor has
parted with cash and has received no down payment. Id. For these reasons, and because the prop-
erty sold did not belong originally to the third-party lender, applying an anti-deficiency statute and
limiting relief to the property conveyed will not restore this lender to his original position.
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vent the statute. Broad judicial interpretations of the statute have eliminated the
mortgagee's personal cause of action on the note, thereby strictly limiting his
relief to an in rem foreclosure proceeding.38 In addition, the supreme court has
rejected the argument that the anti-deficiency statute should apply only to
purchase money mortgages secured by residential property.39 Finally, the court
has refused to allow mortgagors to waive protection of the anti-deficiency stat-
ute, and thus has rendered void any express contractual provisions that attempt
to deem the statute inapplicable.4°
Because plaintiff in Merritt unsuccessfully disputed the "no waiver" inter-
pretation of the statute,41 the principal issue faced by the court was whether the
anti-deficiency statute barred recovery of attorneys' fees and other costs associ-
ated with foreclosure.42 In resolving this issue, the court had to ascertain
whether the general assembly intended its use of "deficiency judgment" in sec-
tion 45-21.38 to include these costs. In its attempt to define the components of a
deficiency judgment, the Merritt court looked to the legislative purposes for en-
acting the anti-deficiency statute and also examined section 45-21.31, the statute
that governs the distribution of foreclosure sale proceeds.
The first source the court examined was the legislative purpose underlying
38. The court applied a broad interpretation of the statute in Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 373, 250 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1979). In Ross Realty a purchase money
creditor attempted to bring an in personam action to recover on the note, rather than seek payment
by liquidating the security through an in rem foreclosure proceeding (to which the anti-deficiency
statute clearly applied). The supreme court rejected the notion that a purchase money mortgagee
had an option to elect between an in personam and an in rem proceeding and concluded that the
general assembly intended to take away the creditor's option of suing on the note. ld. Faced with a
similar issue six years later, the court again read the statute broadly. See Barnaby v. Boardman, 313
N.C. 565, 566, 330 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1985). InBarnaby, the purchase money mortgagee attempted to
release his security interest and thereby create an unsecured note on which to sue. Once again the
supreme court refused to recognize a mortgagee's attempt to circumvent the effects of the anti-
deficiency statute. This time, however, the court declared that the "holder [mortgagee] must look
exclusively to the property conveyed in seeking to recover any balance owed." Id.
39. See Barnaby, 313 N.C. at 570-71, 330 S.E.2d at 603-04 (concluding that the general assem-
bly did not indicate any specific exclusion of the statute's application to purchase money mortgages
secured by commercial property, and thus refusing to draw any distinction between commercial and
residential property transactions). For a discussion of the distinction drawn by other jurisdictions,
see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
40. See Barnaby, 313 N.C. at 568-69, 330 S.E.2d at 602; Bank v. Belk, 41 N.C. App. 356, 367,
255 S.E.2d 421, 428, disc rev. denied, 298 N.C. 293, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
41. See Merritt, 323 N.C. at 336, 372 S.E.2d at 563. The express language of section 45-21.38
strongly supports the court's "no waiver" construction. The statute provides that "the seller...
shall cause a provision to be inserted in said note disclosing that it is for purchase money of real
estate; in default of which the seller ... shall be liable to purchaser for any loss which he might
sustain by reason of the failure to insert said provisions .. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1984).
Plaintiff neglected to assert any unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations based upon
article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. It is doubtful, however, that a constitutional
attack on the anti-deficiency statute would prevail in light of prior United States Supreme Court
decisions upholding similar debtor relief measures. See, eg., Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937) (upholding mortgagor's right to dispute that
foreclosure sale price represents fair market value); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 447 (1934) (upholding Minnesota law allowing mortgagor to defer mortgagee's right to a defi-
ciency judgment for the statutory period of redemption).
42. Because of the "no waiver" interpretation of the statute, the provision that expressly allo-
cates the foreclosure costs to the buyer becomes material only if the general assembly's definition of
"deficiency judgment" excludes these costs.
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the enactment of the anti-deficiency statute. Following its own previous inter-
pretations, the court reasserted that the legislature intended to protect buyers
from oppression by mortgagee-sellers. 43 The supreme court and the court of
appeals disagreed, however, on the question whether permitting recovery of the
foreclosure costs and attorneys' fees would undermine this legislative purpose.
While the court of appeals decided that the statutory prohibition of deficiency
judgments applied only to recovery of the unpaid purchase price, the supreme
court concluded that the general assembly intended an absolute ban on recovery
of any costs associated with defaults by mortgagors. To effectuate its interpreta-
tion of the legislative purpose, the supreme court fashioned a judicial remedy
that restricted the mortgagee-seller either to the property conveyed44 or to the
proceeds from the foreclosure sale.4 5
Even if one accepts the supreme court's interpretation of the general assem-
bly;s intent,46 the Merritt majority never explained how extending section 45-
21.38 to prohibit recovery of foreclosure costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
would further any legislative purpose aimed at eliminating mortgagor oppres-
sion. Although the general assembly may have intended to discourage seller
financing, nothing in the statute's language indicates an intent to eliminate its
use completely.4 7 At most, it appears the general assembly intended to ensure
an equitable distribution of the risks associated with seller financing.
If the general assembly did intend to distribute equitably the risks between
mortgagee-seller and mortgagor-buyer, then the court's decisions prior to Mer-
ritt seem sufficient to accomplish this goal. First, by restricting the mortgagee to
the property conveyed, the court reallocated the risk of declining property val-
ues to the seller.48 Furthermore, the anti-deficiency statute as previously inter-
preted provided the buyer with a unilateral right to rescind on the note.49
Simply by electing to discontinue payment on the note, the mortgagor could
43. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 334, 372 S.E.2d at 562 (following Barnaby and Ross Realty Co. v. First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979)). For a discussion of Barnaby and
Ross Realty see supra note 38.
44. Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 370, 250 S.E.2d 271,273
(1979) (quoted with approval in Barnaby, 313 N.C. at 569, 330 S.E.2d at 602).
45. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 336, 372 S.E.2d at 563.
46. While many courts and commentators agree that these inequities exist with residential
seller financing, far fewer agree that these inequities exist with commercial transactions. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 24, at 401-02. See infra notes 75-79 for a discussion of other jurisdictions' anti-
deficiency legislation and the judicial accommodations made for commercial mortgagees.
47. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 42 (anti-deficiency statute abrogated only the
remedy, not the practice of seller financing itself).
48. See Note, supra note 6, at 860 (stating that the anti-deficiency statute as interpreted in Ross
Realty forces the mortgagee to bear "not only the risk of overvaluation of the security at the time of
the sale, but also the risk of a decline in value of the mortgaged premises occurring after the sale").
Thus, the seller can no longer reach the personal assets of the buyer when the unpaid purchase price
exceeds the proceeds from the foreclosure sale. This reallocation of risks favors mortgagors because
it eliminates variables outside their control, such as seller-established purchase prices, general eco-
nomic decline, and below market value foreclosure sale prices that can create deficiencies and subject
a buyer's unmortgaged assets to a deficiency judgment. Although the buyer still forfeits any pay-
ments made to the seller, these payments arguably only compensates the seller for the buyer's use of
the property prior to default. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 22, at 30.
49. See Note, supra note 24, at 401 (citing Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
37 N.C. App. 33, 36, 245 S.E.2d 404, 406-07 (1978), rev'd, 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979)),
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escape further personal liability.5 0 At the same time the buyer elected to default,
the costs at issue in Merritt became a necessary expenditure for the mortgagee to
incur in pursuit of the only remedy surviving the court's prior decisions-fore-
closure.51 Thus, given that the court's previous decisions redistributed the ma-
jority of seller-financing risks to the mortgagee, the Merritt court's prohibition
on bargaining over foreclosure costs and attorneys' fees seems unnecessary to
further any legislative purpose.
In addition to ascertaining the statutory meaning of deficiency judgment
from the legislative purposes of section 45-21.38, the Merritt court also justified
its definition by reference to section 45-21.31, 52 which governs the distribution
of foreclosure sale proceeds.53 Section 45-21.31 expressly requires that specified
items, such as the foreclosure costs and trustee commissions plaintiff sought in
Merritt, be paid with the gross proceeds from the sale.54 Upon payment of these
costs, the statute authorizes use of the net proceeds toward satisfaction of the
mortgagor's obligation on the note.55 Finally, any surplus proceeds are remitted
to the mortgagor. 56
The supreme court read the distribution requirements of section 45-21.31 in
conjunction with the anti-deficiency statute's prohibition on deficiency judg-
ments. The court concluded that elimination of deficiency judgments meant the
mortgagee should bear the entire loss from any deficiencies, including any defi-
ciency created by first using the proceeds to pay the foreclosure costs.5 7 With-
out explanation, the court in effect deemed section 45-21.31 to authorize the
costs to be included in calculating the amount of any deficiency disallowed by
section 45-21.38.
Section 45-21.31 clearly does govern the disposition of proceeds. It is less
clear, however, that the general assembly intended it to supplement the anti-
deficiency provisions and thereby place foreclosure costs ultimately on the mort-
gagee when a deficiency occurs.5 8 Nevertheless, the court's reliance on section
50. See Note, supra note 24, at 401.
51. The court stated that the mortgagee was limited strictly to either the property conveyed or
the foreclosure sale proceeds. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 336, 372 S.E.2d at 563. Because the mortgagee
must foreclose the mortgagor's equity of redemption to quiet title, foreclosure costs and related
attorneys' fees are necessary expenditures.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.31 (1984).
53. The statute provides in part:
(a) The proceeds of any sale shall be applied by the person making the sale, in the
following order, to the payment of-
(1) Costs and expenses of the sale, including the trustee's commission, if any
(4) The obligation secured by the mortgage, deed of trust, or conditional sale
contract.
(b) Any surplus remaining after the application of the proceeds of the sale as set out
in subsection (a) shall be paid to the person or persons entitled thereto ....
Id. § 45-21.31.
54. Id. § 45-21.31(a)(1).
55. Id. § 45-21.31(a)(4).
56. Id. § 45-21.31(b).
57. See Merritt, 323 N.C. at 336, 372 S.E.2d at 563.
58. It is important to remember that the parties in Merritt expressly bargained over who should
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45-21.31 to define the scope of the anti-deficiency statute appears justified for
two reasons. First, section 45-21.31 establishes a priority system and requires
payment of certain enumerated items before authorizing distribution of any net
proceeds to the parties next in line.59 Moreover, although the statute specifically
entitles the mortgagor to "any surplus," it fails to state which party should bear
the loss if a deficiency results. 6° One possibility is that the general assembly
simply neglected to address the deficiency scenario. More likely, however, the
general assembly was aware of the anti-deficiency statute and intended section
45-21.31 to govern the deficiency situation. 61 Thus, by implication it appears
the general assembly intended section 45-21.31 to force the mortgagee to bear
any foreclosure costs as part of the disallowed deficiency judgment.
A second justification for the Merritt court's cross reference to section 45-
21.31 is that the interpretation is equitable. Whether the mortgagor or mortga-
gee bears foreclosure costs depends upon whether a surplus or a deficiency re-
suits from the sale. If a deficiency occurs, then the mortgagee bears these costs
in the form of a disallowed deficiency judgment under section 45-21.38. On the
other hand, if a surplus results, then the mortgagor ultimately bears the foreclo-
sure costs as a decrease in the surplus proceeds she receives under the section 45-
21.31 distribution system.62 This method of allocation achieves an equitable re-
sult because it encourages the mortgagee to obtain a foreclosure sale price at
least sufficient to cover the foreclosure costs plus the balance owed on the note,
while at the same time it does not enable the mortgagor to participate in any
surplus without bearing the costs created by his own default.
Even if the Merritt court justifiably refused to award the mortgagee recov-
ery of foreclosure costs, neither the legislative purposes behind section 45-21.38
nor the priority system of section 45-21.31 justifies denial of the attorneys' fees.
The court's denial of attorneys' fees is the most unsatisfactory part of its opinion
because of the illogical application of accepted canons of statutory construction.
Plaintiff asserted that section 6-21.263 controlled the awarding of attorneys'
fees because by its express terms the statute provided for recovery of attorneys'
fees "arising from the collection of indebtedness." 64 Rejecting this argument,
bear the costs associated with foreclosure. Moreover, plaintiff-seller never argued that the defaulting
mortgagor always should bear these costs, but only that the court should recognize the parties' right
to bargain. Presumably, in the absence of an express provision, section 45-21.31 would allocate these
costs to the seller. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Yet, the court never explained why
its "no waiver" interpretation associated with the anti-deficiency statute also applies to section 45-
21.31.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.31(a) (1984).
60. See id § 45-21.31(b).
61. The 1933 anti-deficiency statute predated section 45-21.31, which was enacted in 1949. Un-
like the distribution of a surplus, which requires a separate determination of entitlement, the distri-
bution of the proceeds in a deficiency situation occurs by systematically following the provisions in
section 45-21.31(a).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.31(b) (1984).
63. Id. § 6-21.2 (1986). In general, American courts disfavor awarding attorneys' fees to the
successful party. Section 6-21.2, however, provides that "[o]bligations to pay attorneys' fees upon
any note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebtedness,. . . shall be valid and enforcea-
ble, and collectible as part of such debt ...." Id. (emphasis added).
64. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 337, 372 S.E.2d at 563.
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the court first stated an accepted rule of statutory construction that when "one
statute deals with a particular situation in detail, while another deals with it in
general and comprehensive terms, the particular statute will be construed as
controlling absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.' '65 Because the court
believed section 45-21.38 dealt with the particular situation presented, and be-
cause the court found no clear legislative intent to the contrary, the court ap-
plied the anti-deficiency statute to deny recovery of the attorneys' fees.
A closer examination of the court's analysis here reveals two problems with
its application of the statutory construction rule. First, the Merritt court incor-
rectly formulated the issue by assuming from the outset that attorneys' fees con-
stituted one element of a deficiency judgment. 66 More specifically, the court
construed the case as one involving a deficiency judgment comprised of attor-
neys' fees and a deed of trust used to secure a purchase money debt. Not sur-
prisingly, the court then found the anti-deficiency statute to address in detail the
issue presented. Yet, in no way did the court attempt to justify its assumption
that foreclosure-related attorneys' fees constituted part of a deficiency
judgment. 67
Even if the court correctly concluded that the drafters of section 45-21.38
contemplated the particular situation presented, section 6-21.2 contains evidence
of a contrary legislative intent that should have justified departing from the anti-
deficiency provisions. First, section 6-21.2 indicates the general assembly's de-
parture from the general rule that disallows recovery of attorneys' fees under
any circumstances. Second, although the statute broadly permits recovery of
attorneys' fees "upon any note," it narrowly limits recovery to those fees that are
reasonable in amount and expressly contracted for in the debt instrument.
68
The majority disposed of this issue unsatisfactorily by summarily concluding
that "[n]o such clear legislative intent to the contrary appear[s]."' 69 However, as
Justice Whichard persuasively argued in dissent, "[n]either the express terms of
the [anti-deficiency] statute nor its underlying policy requires" placing a judicial
gloss on the statute that denies mortgagees the benefits of a bargain.
70
The Merritt decision continued the supreme court's trend of broadly con-
struing section 45-21.38.71 The effect of this broad interpretation, when applied
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. See id.
67. The court should have formulated the situation presented in a manner that avoided reliance
on an unfounded assumption. For example, the court could have phrased the issue as whether the
anti-deficiency statute prohibits a party from contracting for attorneys' fees incurred to foreclose and
collect payment on a secured debt. When formulated in this manner, section 6-21.2 seems to address
the issue squarely, because it expressly permits recovery on "[o]bligations to pay attorneys' fees upon
any note . . . or other evidence of indebtedness." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2 (1986) (emphasis
added).
68. Id. § 6-21.2. Plaintiff in Merritt expressly contracted to recover attorneys' fees and sought
recovery of 15 percent of the outstanding balance of the debt. See Merritt, 323 N.C. at 332, 372
S.E.2d at 561. The statute specifically deems reasonable the recovery of fees up to 15 percent. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2(1) (1986).
69. Merritt, 323 N.C. at 337, 372 S.E.2d at 563.
70. Id. at 338, 372 S.E.2d at 564 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
71. The broad construction of the statute started with Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank &
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to commercial transactions, is to preclude mortgagee-sellers from bargaining
over foreclosure costs and attorneys' fees. The result is a drastic reduction in the
mortgagee-seller's ability to control risk in a seller-financed transaction. 72 While
the prophylactic purpose of the statute may justify the effects of these decisions
in residential real estate transactions, an argument for equitable redistribution of
seller-financed risks to protect mortgagors from oppression seems untenable in
commercial transactions. 73
Commercial mortgagors, unlike residential home buyers, purchase real es-
tate for the purpose of taking risks in order to turn a profit. Traditionally a
commercial mortgagor, like defendant in Merritt, who speculated in land for
profit, bore the entire risk of his business investment. 74 The supreme court's
decisions up to and including Merritt enable a commercial real estate investor to
engage in "no risk" land speculation and thus misallocate the investment risks in
real estate transactions. 75 This misallocation of risks may have the effect of dis-
couraging mortgagee-vendors from providing seller financing that facilitates
commercial -development.76 Commercial mortgagors should not be able to
avoid investment-related risks by claiming the umbrella protections currently
existing under North Carolina's anti-deficiency statute.
The narrowing of the commercial mortgagee's rights is most disturbing
when compared to the rights of mortgagees in other states with anti-deficiency
legislation similar to that in North Carolina.77 In all of these states, either
through an express legislative provision or by judicial interpretation, the mortga-
gee is afforded at least one of the rights that North Carolina has eliminated by
broad judicial construction. In particular, these states either provide the mort-
gagee with an election of remedies78 or limit the anti-deficiency statute to resi-
Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979), continued in Barnaby v. Boardman, 313 N.C. 565,
330 S.E.2d 600 (1985), and was further expanded in Merritt.
72. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
73. See Note, supra note 6, at 865 (stating that applications of the statute "in the context of
commercial transactions in land call into question the wisdom of permitting the statute to remain in
force"). But see Barnaby, 313 N.C. at 570-71, 330 S.E.2d at 603-04 (rejecting an argument that the
anti-deficiency statute should not apply to purchase money mortgages relating to commercial trans-
actions because the general assembly did not indicate any specific exclusion).
74. See Note, supra note 6, at 861.
75. See Merritt, 323 N.C. 330, 372 S.E.2d 559 (1988); Barnaby v. Boardman, 313 N.C. 565, 330
S.E.2d 600 (1985); Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d
271 (1979); see also Note, supra note 6, at 865 (claiming Ross Realty decision "disrupts traditional
allocation of risk concepts in commercial real estate transactions").
76. See Note, supra note 24, at 401 (noting that a commercial buyer's unilateral right to rescind
shifts the risks of commercial development and speculation to the mortgagee and thus will "have a
substantial effect on commercial real estate development").
77. At least five other states have anti-deficiency legislation similar to North Carolina's section
45-21.38. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-729 (1974); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1972);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 93-6008 (1964); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.070 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN.
§ 44-8-20 (1967).
78. By judicial decision, Oregon permits the mortgagee to choose between suing on the note or
bringing a foreclosure action upon the buyer's default. See, e.g., Bantier v. Harrison, 259 Or. 182,
485 P.2d 1073 (1971); Ward v. Beem Corp., 249 Or. 204, 437 P.2d 483 (1968). Likewise, South
Dakota allows the mortgagee an election of remedies. See Federal Land Bank v. Schley, 67 S.D. 476,
293 N.W. 879 (1940).
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dential real estate transactions. 79 Thus, while other states' have restricted the
scope of their anti-deficiency statutes, North Carolina courts continue to expand
the statute's application.
In addition to misallocating the risks associated with commercial real estate
transactions, the supreme court's broad construction of the anti-deficiency stat-
ute creates uncertainty in seller-financed transactions. 80 One unresolved issue is
whether the anti-deficiency statute prohibits an in personam action by a seller,
who, after subordinating her purchase money mortgage, has the underlying se-
curity involuntarily extinguished when a senior lienholder of the mortgagor fore-
closes. 8' Frequently, because construction lenders refuse to supply financing for
material and labor unless made senior lienholders, the mortgagee-vendor subor-
dinates her debt to accommodate the developer-mortgagor.8 2 If the senior
lienholder subsequently forecloses and leaves the mortgagee-vendor unpaid and
without security, then applying the anti-deficiency statute to deny the mortgagee
a "deficiency judgment" seems unfair, especially when it is often the mortgagor's
incompetence or poor planning that caused the project to fail and the senior
lienholder to foreclose.8 3
A second uncertainty created by the supreme court's broad construction of
the statute is the possibility that guarantors who personally guarantee payment
of the obligation may seek protection under the statute.84 Protecting the guar-
antor from liability for the very event-foreclosure sale proceeds insufficient to
79. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-729 (1974) (eliminating deficiency judgments when mort-
gage is secured by "either a single one-family or single two-family dwelling"); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 580b (West 1972) (eliminating deficiency judgments when mortgage is secured by "a dwell-
ing for not more than four families"); First State Bank v. Chunkapura, 734 P.2d 1203, 1210-11
(Mont. 1987) (on rehearing, court limited application of the anti-deficiency statute to mortgages held
on "occupied, single family residential property"). But see Cottage Grove Apt. Investors v.
Brandenfels, 69 Or. App. 1922 197, 684 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1984) (Oregon Court of Appeals stated that
attorneys' fees and foreclosure costs do constitute deficiency judgment when relating to foreclosure
on residential property secured by a deed of trust).
80. One possible means of avoiding the negative effects of the anti-deficiency statute is to frac-
tionalize the debt. See Leipziger, supra note 6, at 812. Fractionalization involves splitting the debt
into two or more parts, with each part evidenced by a separate instrument and with one or more
parts either unsecured or secured by collateral other than the property sold. See Leipziger, supra
note 6, at 758 n.20.
81. See Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 217 N.C. 486, 487-88, 8 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1940) (seller, who held
a junior purchase money mortgage, allowed to recover deficiency judgment because debt remained
unpaid after senior lienholder foreclosed and extinguished the security). The supreme court rejected
the reasoning of Brown when it declared that a purchase money mortgagor could not voluntarily
release the security and then bring an in personam action on the note. See Barnaby v. Boardman, 313
N.C. 565, 570, 330 S.E.2d 600, 603 (1985). One commentator has concluded that Brown can be
distinguished from Barnaby because of the involuntary extinguishment of the security in Brown. See
Note, supra note 24, at 398 (implying Brown still should be good law). But see Sink v. Egerton, 76
N.C. App. 526, 528-29, 333 S.E.2d 520, 521-22 (1985) (distinguishing Brown and disallowing an in
personam action by a subordinate purchase money mortgage holder who involuntarily had underly-
ing security extinguished).
82. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 12.9.
83. See Leipziger, supra note 6, at 774. Leipziger notes that requiring the developer to indem-
nify the mortgagee by means of a deficiency judgment properly forces the developer to bear the risk
of project failure. See Leipziger, supra note 6, at 769.
84. See Brown v. Owens, 251 N.C. 348, 350, 111 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1959) (concluding that mort-
gagee is not barred by anti-deficiency judgment statute from obtaining judgment against endorsers
on an unsecured note).
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satisfy the mortgagor's debt-against which the guarantor promised to indem-
nify the mortgagee seems inconsistent with the agreement between the guarantor
and mortgagee, who relied upon the guarantor's promise in extending the
loan.s 5 The better view is that this transaction more closely resembles third-
party financing by the guarantor, a lending transaction to which the anti-defi-
ciency statute does not apply.
Due to the negative effects of broadly construed anti-deficiency legislation,
and because economic conditions and markets have changed significantly since
the enactment of the statute, the North Carolina General Assembly should
reevaluate whether the statute continues to serve any useful purpose. Because
third-party lenders finance most present-day residential real estate transactions,
the statute's original prophylactic purpose of protecting farmers and homeown-
ers from oppression has dissipated. 86 More importantly, the anti-deficiency stat-
ute, fueled by broad judicial interpretations, remains dangerously powerful in
the commercial real estate sector. The general assembly should act to restore
the traditional economic and legal notions that investors, not mortgagee-sellers,
bear the risks associated with commercial land purchases motivated by profit
expectations.
G. STEPHEN DIAB
85. Generally a guarantor is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and can seek a judgment
against the mortgagor. Given the broad construction of the anti-deficiency statute and the "no
waiver" policy, the supreme court might consider this maneuver an attempt by the mortgagee to
circumvent the statute and deny the mortgagee a cause of action even against the guarantor.
86. See Note, supra note 22, at 401.
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